Seven states get 61% of India's CSR spending, while 112 aspirational districts get 6.8%. Why CSR funds in India stay skewed and how to fix it.

CSR funds in India remain skewed towards a few states

Analysis

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) carries a promise it has yet to fully fulfil, and CSR funds in India remain skewed towards a few places. Their distribution resembles a pattern familiar from economics and sociology, the Matthew effect, in which existing advantages reinforce themselves rather than diffuse. Regions with greater industrial and institutional capacity may be better positioned to attract resources intended to address developmental disparities.

CSR spending appears to follow a similar pattern. An empirical study by researchers at the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Delhi and the High-Level Committee on CSR constituted in 2018 both identified a concentration of CSR funds in a relatively small group of states and districts. Yet eight years after the committee’s recommendations, and following subsequent regulatory changes, this concentration persists. The implications are particularly significant for India’s 112 aspirational districts, which received only 6.8% of total CSR spending in FY2024-25, despite being identified as development priorities.

This persistence points to two plausible forces. Firms tend to spend near their operations, and few local agencies exist to receive funds elsewhere. Current data cannot separate the two, so policy should begin with steps that can.

What drives where CSR money goes

Before the 2021 CSR amendment rules, an empirical study by Pareek et al. (2020) at IIT Delhi examined the factors associated with the geographical distribution of CSR funds, using CSR data from 2014-17. The researchers used statistical regression models to examine which districts or parliamentary constituencies were associated with higher CSR funding.

Across all three models, the Aggregate Development Index (ADI), which measures a region’s socio-economic change through satellite imagery, and the number of factories remain positive and significant. The models’ explanatory power more than doubles when industrial variables are added (R² rises from 0.121 to 0.283), while political variables add comparatively little (0.296 in the third model). The study therefore indicates that more developed and industrial constituencies were associated with higher CSR funding.

Determinants & Concentration of CSR Funding in India

Constituency-level regression models (543 constituencies) & state share
Model Explanatory Power (R²)
Model 1 (Baseline ADI)
0.121
Model 2 (+ Industrial factors)
0.283
Model 3 (+ Political factors)
0.296
Selected Regression Estimates
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Aggregate Development Index (ADI) 0.0899*** 0.059*** 0.055***
Number of factories in constituency not included 0.359*** 0.356***
R² 0.121 0.283 0.296
Note: Selected results from Pareek et al. (2020), 543 constituencies. *** marks statistical significance at the 0.1% level. Political variables, entered only in Model 3, are omitted here.
Geographical Share of CSR Expenditure (FY2014-15 to FY2016-17)
7 Major Recipients (39.21% average): Maharashtra, Karnataka, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Delhi.

This suggests that CSR concentration reflects the structural advantage of place, not where the developmental gaps are. Consistent with this pattern, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Delhi accounted for an average of 39.21% of CSR expenditure during FY2014-15 to FY2016-17, according to the Ministry of Corporate Affairs’ state expenditure data.

Latest data shows sharper concentration

A decade later, contemporary CSR data reveals much sharper concentration. The state expenditure data for FY2024-25 shows that the same cohort of industrial and economically developed states and Union territories (Maharashtra, Karnataka, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Delhi) receive 61% of total CSR expenditure of Rs 408bn, calculated as each state’s expenditure divided by the total.

The district expenditure data for FY2024-25 shows sharper concentration still. Ranking all 727 districts by their share of total expenditure, the top five (Mumbai, Pune, Ahmedabad, Chennai and Delhi) account for about 25% of total CSR spending, while the bottom 300 districts together receive less than 2%. In the same way, the 112 aspirational districts, designated by NITI Aayog as among the country’s least developed, make up only 6.8% of total CSR expenditure.

Geographical Concentration of CSR Expenditure (FY2024-25)

Share of total CSR spending (Rs 408bn) across states and 727 districts
State & Union Territory Split (Total: Rs 408bn)
7 Major Recipients (61%): Maharashtra, Karnataka, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Delhi.
District-Level Share (Out of 727 Districts)
Top 5 districts
~25.0%
112 Aspirational districts
6.8%
Bottom 300 districts
<2.0%
Top 5 Districts (~25% Share)
5 Districts
Mumbai, Pune, Ahmedabad, Chennai & Delhi
NITI Aayog Aspirational Cohort
6.8% Share
Across 112 least developed districts combined

Why CSR funds in India stay concentrated

The 2021 clarification by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) made the local-area preference under Section 135(5) directory rather than mandatory, yet concentration persists and has deepened. The preference alone cannot explain this. The evidence points to two forces that act at different stages. One is whether funds have a channel to reach a place, and the other is whether firms choose to send them there.

Since the 2021 CSR amendment rules, CSR routed through external partners must pass through implementing agencies holding CSR-1 registration. The ministry’s master data lists 116,598 registered agencies. The seven states and Union territories analysed above hold 58% of them (their combined share of agencies divided by the total) and receive 61% of CSR funds. Maharashtra alone holds 20.9% of agencies and 21.2% of CSR spending.

At the district level, the bottom 300 districts hold approximately 6% of agencies, and about 106 of the 727 districts have none listed under their name. This is consistent with funds having fewer routes to travel where few agencies exist, though agencies may also register where money already flows.

Yet agencies explain only part of the pattern. Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Bihar hold 9.8%, 6.3% and 2.6% of agencies but receive only 5.4%, 2.6% and 1.1% of CSR funds. Where agencies exist but money does not follow, something upstream of the channel may be deciding.

That upstream decision is where firms choose to spend. Gatignon and Bode, analysing 87,000 projects by more than 12,000 firms in the mandate’s first four years, found that most firms implemented projects close to their head offices, the exceptions being industry leaders and state-owned enterprises. Over half the projects were in four states, with Maharashtra alone at 25%. Firms’ FY2024-25 CSR policy reports suggest the pattern continues despite the 2021 clarification. Tata Power, BHEL and Amber tie CSR to needs near their operations, and BHEL earmarks at least 75% for local areas. These firms are illustrative, not exhaustive. NTPC, JSW Steel, ITL and many others follow a similar approach.

CSR Implementing Agencies vs Actual Fund Flows

Share of 116,598 CSR-1 registered agencies compared against share of CSR expenditure
Share of CSR-1 Agencies Share of CSR Funds (Aligned / High) Share of CSR Funds (Under-allocated)
Industrial & Developed Regions (Agency-Fund Alignment)
Top 7 States & UTs Combined
CSR-1 Agencies
58.0%
CSR Funds
61.0%
Maharashtra Alone
CSR-1 Agencies
20.9%
CSR Funds
21.2%
States Where Agencies Exist Without Matching Fund Flows
Uttar Pradesh
CSR-1 Agencies
9.8%
CSR Funds
5.4%
West Bengal
CSR-1 Agencies
6.3%
CSR Funds
2.6%
Bihar
CSR-1 Agencies
2.6%
CSR Funds
1.1%
District Agency Deficit
~106 Districts
Out of 727 have zero listed CSR-1 agencies; bottom 300 hold ~6%
Headquarters Proximity
>50% Projects
Clustered in 4 states (25% in Maharashtra alone)
Local Area Earmarking
≥75% Local
Earmarked by BHEL; Tata Power, NTPC & JSW tie spend to sites

Taken together, proximity shapes where firms want to spend, and agency networks shape whether the channel exists. Where both align, as in Maharashtra and other states, funds are abundant. Where firms are absent and agencies thin, funding is least likely to arrive. This is consistent with the Matthew effect, though the data cannot weigh the two forces. What they do show is that removing the legal preference has not removed the structure that sustains concentration.

How to rebalance CSR funds in India

The clarification that the local-area preference under Section 135(5) is directory rather than mandatory has not, by itself, altered CSR concentration. Policy should therefore focus not on overriding local needs but on three gaps, namely places with no channel, a lack of visibility into where firms spend and the absence of a benchmark for aspirational districts.

First, the ministry should pilot agency support in the 106 districts with no registered implementing agency. Local organisations would receive technical help to obtain CSR-1 registration and list proposals on the National CSR eXchange Portal. Success would be measured by registrations and CSR inflows over two to three years. If inflows rise, capacity was a binding constraint. If not, the problem lies with firms’ choices, and the response should shift.

Second, the ministry should compile the data into a dynamic CSR dataset showing each company’s share of spending in its registered state, in other states and in aspirational districts. Disclosure is cheap, preserves discretion and would show whether the preference Gatignon and Bode describe persists.

Third, the ministry should set a benchmark for CSR spending in aspirational districts, which currently receive 6.8% of the total, to be raised as implementing agencies and project proposals in these districts grow. Companies would report against it and explain any shortfall in their annual CSR report. A benchmark with public reporting gives firms a viable pipeline to choose from and gives the ministry evidence on whether a binding minimum is needed.

These measures offer a starting point for examining how the two forces interact and what might be needed to extend CSR funding to underserved districts.

A dentist and an independent researcher with strong interest in governance and public policy. Analyses issues and writes commentaries that deal with public policy implementation and governance.