Judging India’s climate commitments fairly at COP31
India finds itself in a familiar position in international climate talks. It is trying to secure its development rights while facing criticism for being one of the world’s largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters. Some of this criticism is valid. India ranks third in emissions, industries are increasing their energy needs, and coal continues to dominate its power sector. With COP31 underway in Antalya, it is worth asking whether the global community measures climate responsibility as carefully as it measures emissions. That question sits at the heart of India’s climate commitments.
Per-capita emissions tell different story
India’s GHG emissions amounted to about 4.51bn tonnes of CO2-equivalent in 2025, accounting for 8.3% of global emissions. However, the picture changes when population is taken into account. India’s per-capita emissions were 3.1 tonnes, as against 6.6 tonnes worldwide. The United States, Russia, China and the European Union (EU) had 17.5, 18.1, 11.1 and 7.1 tonnes per capita, respectively. US per-capita emissions are more than five times India’s. These figures from the European Commission’s 2026 Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research show that the issue is more complicated than commonly perceived.
Per-Capita Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Major Emitter (2025)
History and fairness in India’s climate commitments
The Global Carbon Budget 2025 illustrates the historical imbalance. Cumulative fossil-fuel and industrial carbon dioxide emissions from 1850 to 2024 were about 24% in the United States, 16% in the EU, 15% in China and only 4% in India. These figures cover historical fossil-fuel and industrial CO2 emissions, not all greenhouse gases. It is understandable to require developing countries to move faster, but unreasonable to ignore this inequality.
Historical Cumulative CO2 Emissions (1850–2024)
This is why the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities is central to international climate discussions. It was recognised in Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration at the 1992 Earth Summit and subsequently reflected in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Yet it has still to be fully realised. A country trying to ensure access to electricity, affordable housing, transport infrastructure, and employment for its huge population should not follow the same decarbonisation path as an economy that has finished industrialisation.
Falling intensity, rising renewables and stubborn coal
India’s emissions almost tripled from 1990. However, emissions intensity moved in the opposite direction. According to the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre, India’s emissions intensity fell from 0.693 tonnes of CO2 equivalent per thousand dollars of GDP in 1990 to 0.294 tonnes in 2025, a decline of almost 58%.
In June 2025, India reached the landmark of obtaining 50% of installed electricity capacity from non-fossil fuel sources, nearly five and a half years ahead of its 2030 target. India aims to achieve 500 GW of non-fossil fuel electricity capacity by 2030 and become net-zero in emissions by 2070.
However, installed capacity does not guarantee electricity production. In 2024-25, coal still accounted for about 73% of India’s electricity generation. India needs energy storage, stronger transmission networks and a grid to carry electricity from non-fossil-fuel sources. The change also poses considerable employment challenges in areas that depend on coal.
Adaptation and trade pressures
Adaptation remains an equally important priority alongside mitigation. Severe heat waves, floods, cyclones, unsteady monsoons and water stress pose dangers to life, property and health. A large population is not the root cause of this vulnerability, but it is a devastating multiplier. When calamities hit densely populated regions that lack resilience, the human costs are massive. India needs greater adaptation support to protect vulnerable populations and strengthen their capacity to withstand climate impacts.
Climate policy is now also affecting trade. The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) imposes a carbon price on certain imports such as steel and aluminium. But when companies exporting to the EU face additional costs without affordable technology and finance to make the shift, the playing field becomes uneven. Indian steel and aluminium manufacturers find it difficult to absorb higher costs in European markets. The question is not about reducing emissions but whether trade policy recognises the situation and encourages a shift.
Advanced economies and finance gap
Advanced economies and developing nations must show equal commitment to combat the climate crisis. By 2025, GHG emissions had gone up by 2.2% in the United States. The EU has lowered its GHG emissions by 35.6%, but its per-capita emissions are still more than double those in India.
At COP29 in Baku, developed countries agreed to a climate finance goal of at least $300bn annually by 2035, alongside the broader goal of mobilising $1.3 trillion annually. However, a large gap remains between commitments and accessible financing. India needs climate finance not only for solar parks but to upgrade grids, fund industrial transition, improve coastal infrastructure and help vulnerable populations withstand extreme heat.
Where India’s climate commitments go next
The ongoing COP31 negotiations give India an opportunity to go beyond defence of its development space and present a model of transition. India has not committed to the proposed global target to raise electricity’s share of final energy consumption to 35% by 2035, emphasising the need to account for national energy requirements and poverty reduction. Greater electrification nevertheless offers an opportunity to accelerate electric mobility and improve industrial efficiency.
India’s negotiating priorities should be clear. They are predictable climate finance, affordable technology transfer, adaptation funding and a just transition. As leader of the International Solar Alliance and the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure, India has platforms to contribute outside its borders. It should also explore engagement with the Open Coalition on Compliance Carbon Markets, which seeks to strengthen cooperation on carbon pricing, monitoring and carbon accounting. This could help India engage with emerging carbon-market rules as the EU’s CBAM increasingly shapes trade.
The challenge is to move from highlighting the Global South’s problems to helping solve them. Ambition without equity will struggle to secure global cooperation. Equity without measurable actions will not solve the climate problem. The task in Antalya is to combine them.
Bhawesh Joshi is a research associate (Policy) at IIM Mumbai.
Disha Sharma is an assistant professor at Indian Institute of Management (IIM) Mumbai with expertise in climate science and policy.

